

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

MESSAGE CENTER

: 1.5 3 4 8

ACTION  
DISTR

| CICS  | J-5     | MCEB     | PA   | H&E      | CIA       | NSA      |
|-------|---------|----------|------|----------|-----------|----------|
| DJS 3 | NMCC 3  | USRMCLD  | DDRE | ASD:PA&E | CSA 1     | RF:MC3   |
| SJCS  | NMCCDDO | SECDEF 5 | ARPA | DTACCS   | CNO 1     | FILE (1) |
| J-1   | JRC     | ADM      | COMP | WSEG     | CSAF 1    | MCCL 1   |
| J-3 4 | NWSB    | ISA 10   | LA   | W/H      | CMC 1     |          |
| J-4   | DAS     | I/L      | AE   | STATE 1  | NSC       |          |
| J-5 2 | SAGA    | G/C      | M/RA | DIA      | ANC SVS 1 | TOTAL 46 |

VZCZCIEC250CIR256

~~SECRET~~

RUEKJCS

DE RUMJFS #5329/3 2540730

ZNY SSSSS

R 220718Z AUG 75

FM

TO RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC

INFO RUHQHQA/COMIPAC HONOLULU HI

BT

~~SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM 1182 AUG 75~~

SECTION 3 OF 3

DIA FOR DC-4 AND AH#3; COMIPAC FOR IPAC#0113

(5) (S/NFD) WHERE ARE THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT OR UNITS BELIEVED TO POSSESS THEM LOCATED, AND WHAT IS PLANNED USE OF THIS EQUIPMENT: TANKS/APC'S, AAA, SA-7 MISSILES, RIOT CONTROL AGENTS AND AIRCRAFT? WILL ANY OF THIS EQUIPMENT BE USED BY PL/NVA FORCES? (C) MILITARY EQUIPMENT MUST BE DIVIDED INTO WHAT FAR/FAN OWNED PRIOR TO 9 MAY 75 AND WHAT PL FORCES OWNED AND MAY HAVE ACQUIRED FROM NON-FAR/FAN SOURCES SINCE 9 MAY 1975, (9 MAY 75 IS DATE LPF MEMBER, KHAM DUAN BOUPHA BECAME ACTING MINISTER OF DEFENSE AND CINCPAC ORDERED FAR ALLIGIANCE), FOR FAR/FAN EQUIPMENT OWNED PRIOR TO 9 MAY 75, ROUTINE REPORTS SUBMITTED TO HQ [REDACTED] MAY BE CONSULTED, THIS EQUIPMENT AND THE OWNING UNITS HAVE FOR THE MOST PART REMAINED IN PLACE SINCE 9 MAY 75, PL EQUIPMENT AND OWNER UNITS, ALTHOUGH REPORTED TO DIA ON A BEST AVAILABLE DATA BASIS PRIOR TO 9 MAY 75, ARE NOW AN UNKNOWN TO [REDACTED] EXCEPT FOR VIENTIANE WHICH WAS PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN IR FORM TO DIA, IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT ANY AND ALL EQUIPMENT OWNED WOULD BE USED BY PL/NVA IN A COMBAT SITUATION, (6) HAVE THE PL ACQUIRED THE PK 7.62MM MACHINEGUN? IF SO, WHEN, WHERE, AND IN WHAT QUANTITY? (C) PL HAVE ACQUIRED PK 7.62MM GENERAL PURPOSE MACHINEGUNS, SEVERAL WERE FIRST SEEN IN MAY 1975 AT THE SOMBOUN LYCEE IN VIENTIANE BY THE [REDACTED] ALSO WAS THEM IN LATE JUNE AT CAMP CHINAIMO, VIENTIANE, TOTAL QUANTITIES, LOCATION AND TIME OF ACQUISITION OF PK 7.62MM MACHINEGUNS OWNED BY ENT PL ARE UNKNOWN TO [REDACTED] (7) (S/NFD) WHAT OTHER WEAPONS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN ACQUIRED BY THE PL? [REDACTED] CAN ONLY RESPOND TO THIS QUESTION BY SAYING THAT NO REPORTS OF NEW WEAPONRY IN THE HANDS OF THE PL HAVE BEEN

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| CJCS | J-6     | MCEB    | PA   | H&E      | CIA  | NSA      |
|------|---------|---------|------|----------|------|----------|
| DJS  | NMCC    | USRMCLD | DORE | ASD:PA&E | CSA  | RF:MCB   |
| SJCS | NMCCDDO | SECDEF  | ARPA | DTACCS   | CNO  | FILE (1) |
| J-1  | JRC     | ADM     | COMP | VSEG     | CSAF |          |
| J-3  | NWSB    | ISA     | LA   | W/H      | CMC  |          |
| J-4  | DAS     | I/L     | AE   | STATE    | NSC  |          |
| J-5  | SAGA    | G/C     | M/RA | DIA      | NIC  | TOTAL    |

RECEIVED, NATURALLY, THE PL HAVE ACQUIRED FAR/FAN  
ORDNANCE ASSETS,  
C. NVA UNITS IN LAOS,

((T KS/NFD) ARE NVA UNITS BEING REINFORCED, BEING MOVED TO  
POSITIONS NEAR PL/FAR/FAN FORCES OR NEUTRAL/RIGHTIST POPULATED  
AREAS? (C) THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION IS BEYOND THE COLLECTION  
CAPABILITY OF [REDACTED] NO NVA UNITS ARE KNOWN TO BE WITHIN  
VIENTIANE,

(2) (S/NFD) WHAT MISSIONS DO THESE FORCES HAVE? (C) THE  
ANSWER TO THIS IS BEYOND THE COLLECTION CAPABILITY OF [REDACTED]

(3) (S/NFD) TO WHAT DEGREE HAVE NVA ELEMENTS BEEN DIRECTED TO  
SUPPORT, REMAIN ALOOF FROM, OR SUBVERT THE EFFORTS OF PL FORCES  
OR LEFTIST DEMONSTRATORS? (C) THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF NVA  
INVOLVEMENT IN RECENT DEMONSTRATIONS WITHIN LAOS, THERE IS NO  
POSSIBILITY OF THE NVA SUBVERTING PL OR DEMONSTRATORS, WHATEVER  
NVA POLICY MAY BE, IT IS UNKNOWN TO [REDACTED]

(4) (S/NFD) WHAT IS NVA CAPABILITY TO REINFORCE PL UNITS?  
(C) NVA ORDER OF BATTLE IN LAOS PRIOR TO 9 MAY 75 WAS ROUTINELY  
REPORTED TO DIA, BASED ON THE LARGE NVA PRESENCE AT THAT TIME,  
AND THE LOCATION AND MOBILITY OF ITS UNITS, THE NVA COULD EASILY  
REINFORCE THE PL ANYWHERE IN COUNTRY, THIS CAPABILITY SURELY  
EXISTS NOW AND PERHAPS TO A GREATER EXTENT, AND IS PARTICULARLY  
EVIDENT IN SUCH KNOWN AREAS OF NVA PRESENCE AS MR III AND IV  
AND EASTERN MR II,

D. LAOS - THAILAND BORDER.

(1) (S/NFD) WHAT IS THE PGNU/LPF POSITION CONCERNING THE  
BORDER BETWEEN LAOS AND THAILAND? (U) PGNU/LPF RECOGNIZES  
PAST TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, AGREEMENTS AND PROTOCOLS REGARDING  
THE BORDER, THESE MAY BE FOUND IN INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUDY  
NUMBER 28 DATE 18 SEP 62, AVAILABLE FROM DEPARTMENT  
OF STATE, DEPARTMENT GEOGRAPHER, WASHINGTON, D.C. HOWEVER, FREQUENT  
ACCOUNTS OF CLASHES FROM OVERT THAI AS WELL AS LAOS SOURCES  
WOULD INDICATE THAT PGNU/LPF HAVE ADOPTED AGGRESSIVE PATROLLING  
TACTICS AT NUMEROUS POINTS ALONG THE MEKONG, NOTABLY VIENTIANE,  
THADEUA, PAKSANE, THAKHET AND SAVANNAKHET,

(2) (S/NFD) WHAT ARE THE CHANGES, IF ANY, IN THE LAOS - THAILAND  
BORDER STATUS? (U) THERE HAVE BEEN NO CHANGES,

(3) (S/NFD) WHAT TROOPS (PL, FAR, OR COMBINATION OF THE TWO)  
ARE MANNING BORDER POSTS? (C) [REDACTED] IS RESTRICTED TO  
VIENTIANE. DATA REQUESTED IS BEYOND HIS COLLECTION CAPABILITY.  
MAIN BORDER CROSSING POINT FOR VIENTIANE IS THADEUA, BORDER  
POSTS, UNDERSTOOD TO BE MILITARY DISPOSITIONS ALONG THE BORDER  
EXIST EVERY HALF MILE NEAR VIENTIANE, FROM THADEUA ON THE  
SOUTHEAST TO BEYOND WATTAY AIRPORT AREA TO THE WEST, EACH POST

## SECRET

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HAS A PL SQUAD OR LESS ARMED WITH AK47 AND B40 RPG TO OBSERVE ACTIVITY ALONG THE BORDER.

(4) (S/NFD) DOES BORDER POLICY APPEAR TO BE COORDINATED ALONG ITS ENTIRE LENGTH, OR DOES IT VARY FROM ONE LOCALE TO ANOTHER?

(C) CONSISTENCY OF PGNU/LPF POLICY ALONG ENTIRE BORDER IS ASSUMED BECAUSE OF PRE-EMINENCE OF THE LPF.

(5) (S/NFD); 8, 2HAI WAY DO BORDER POLICIES/INTERNAL TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS IMPACT ON THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT? (C) PGNU HAD DIRECTED THAT BORDER CROSSING FOR ANY PURPOSE BE ACCOMPLISHED AT ESTABLISHED BORDER CROSSING POINTS, CROSSING AT ANY OTHER LOCATION IS ILLEGAL, SINCE MAY 1975 THERE HAVE BEEN MANY INSTANCES OF PL BORDER POST FORCES FIRING ON THOSE PEOPLE CROSSING AT OTHER THAN AUTHORIZED LOCATIONS, THIS RESTRICTS TRADITIONAL FREE MOVEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, PGNU/LPF HAVE ALSO ESTABLISHED ROADBLOCKS ON ROADS LEADING TO/FROM THADEUA CROSSING POINTS TO CHECK FOR ILLEGAL LINECROSSERS AND CONTRABAND,

GDS 31 DEC 83

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